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Abstract
This paper presents new evidence about wage stickiness and the nature of wage setting. We
use a unique micro dataset on monthly frequency, covering wages in the Icelandic private sector for
the period from 1998-2010, and draw the following conclusions. First, the mean frequency of wage
change is 10.8% per month. When weighted for heterogeneity across industries and occupations
the result is almost identical; the frequency of change is 10.5% per month. Second, only 0.5% of
monthly wage changes are decreases. Third, the mean duration of wage spells is 8.9 months. One-
ﬁfth of wage spells last longer than a year while other spells last for one year or shorter. Fourth,
wage setting displays strong features of time-dependence: half of all wage changes are synchronised
in January, but other adjustments are staggered through the year. Fifth, there is limited evidence
of state-dependence: frequency of wage increases, size of increases, frequency of wage decreases
and size of decreases do not correlate with inﬂation. However, both frequency and size of wage
decreases have signiﬁcant correlation with unemployment. Sixth, the hazard function for wages is
mostly ﬂat during the ﬁrst months but has a large twelve-month spike. These facts align with a
model of time-dependent wage contracts of ﬁxed duration.
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In the Keynesian paradigm, nominal rigidities in prices and wages play a central role in explaining
variations in output and employment. Because of sluggish adjustment of nominal wages and prices to
shocks, changes in money supply can have a real eﬀect on the economy by aﬀecting aggregate output
through the real interest rate. A corollary of this notion of short-run monetary non-neutrality is a
role for active monetary policy.
Following Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), a large number of models have been constructed
to incorporate New Keynesian features, both imperfect competition and nominal wage rigidities. The
theoretical literature has emphasised that introduction of nominal wage rigidity in macroeconomic
models is at least as important a component as price stickiness. In their inﬂuential paper, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) construct a New Keynesian model and follow Erceg et al. (2000) in
modelling staggering of price and wage setting with a Calvo (1983) wage setting mechanism. They
conclude that:
A key ﬁnding of the analysis is that stickiness in nominal wages is crucial for the model’s
performance.
Furthermore, recent research has emphasised that even though inclusion of nominal wage rigidity is
essential, the choice of how wage rigidity is modelled can have quantitative eﬀects. Dixon and Kara
(2011) show that variation in wage contract length, even with only a small proportion of long-term
contracts, can signiﬁcantly increase the degree of output persistence. According to Olivei and Tenreyro
(2007), the timing of wage setting is also important. If wage contracts are not uniformly distributed,
monetary policy will generate diﬀerent output eﬀects depending on when monetary policy shock takes
place. Speciﬁcally, monetary policy actions will have more eﬀect in periods when wages are more
rigid. Even though a deep understanding of wage rigidity is of high importance, both for monetary
policy and for macroeconomic modelling, limited micro evidence exist on the extent of nominal wage
rigidity and the nature of wage setting.
Recently, following Bils and Klenow (2004), an expanding literature – notably Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) – has used extensive high-frequency micro datasets on
prices to evaluate nominal price rigidity and estimate how frequently prices change.1 Following this
path, a very recent but growing literature has used micro datasets on wages to estimate rigidity of
1For a survey of this literature, see Klenow and Malin (2010).
2nominal wages. Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2010) present evidence for the US. They use survey
data, based on interviews with workers that take place every four months for a period of two to four
years. Other papers have presented evidence based on data collected directly from ﬁrms with higher
frequency; Heckel, LeBihan and Montorn´ es (2008) for France and L¨ unnenmann and Wintr (2009) for
Luxembourg. Druant et al. (2009) survey the evidence on nominal wage rigidity in Europe collected
by Eurosystem Wage Dynamic Network.
The aim of the current paper is to shed light on nominal wage rigidity and wage setting in Iceland
and further contribute to the growing literature on nominal wage rigidity.2 We use a unique monthly
frequency database that covers wages for 80% of the Icelandic private sector over a period of 13 years,
between 1998 and 2010. Our comprehensive dataset has the rare potential of giving a clear view of
nominal wage rigidity. The data allow us to evaluate diﬀerent wage setting theories, especially as there
are phases with low, intermediate and high inﬂation and unemployment over the sample period.
Our principal measure of nominal wage rigidity is the frequency of wages adjustments. We ﬁnd
that, in general, wages are adjusted infrequently; the mean frequency of change in a month is 10.8%
for all workers in our sample. As expected, since wage changes are infrequent, the size of adjustments,
both increases and decreases, is large. The mean monthly size of increases is 6.3%, and the mean
absolute size of decreases is 4.8% per month. We ﬁnd wage adjustment to be asymmetric around
zero, as only 5% of wage changes are decreases. The economic literature has identiﬁed this asymmetry
in wage changes as downward nominal wage rigidity: wage changes are more likely to be positive
than negative. This property is further explored in Section 6, where we ﬁnd that, even though the
distribution of wage change displays some of the characteristics predicted under downward nominal
wage rigidity, it does not seem to be binding. In particular, in the recession beginning in 2008, nominal
wage cuts appear to have been one of the channels for adjustment in the labour market.
The estimates of the mean frequency of wage change can be inverted to give a measure of the mean
duration of wage spells. We ﬁnd that the mean implied duration of wage spells is 8.7 months, close
to three quarters. Next we deviate from the assumption of constant probability of wage change and
look at the distribution of wage spell durations in our sample. The mean duration of wage spells is 8.9
months, similar to the inverse of the mean frequency, and the median length is 7 months. Furthermore,
2The relevant papers using Icelandic wage data are Agnarsson et al. (1999), Jonsson and Johannesson (2002), and
Andrason (2007), who study changes in nominal and real wages in relation to the general ﬂexibility of the Icelandic labour
market. Zoega and Karlsson (2006) use Icelandic survey data to study the microfoundations of downward nominal wage
rigidity.
3we ﬁnd that there is a wide range of contracts of diﬀerent lengths and roughly 20% of spells last beyond
one year.
The theoretical literature modelling price and wage setting can broadly be separated into time-
dependent and state-dependent duration models. We investigate whether wage adjustment is time-
dependent and, speciﬁcally, if wage setting is synchronised at certain dates or staggered over time.
Wage setting is found to be considerably synchronised, as 48% of wage change take place in January.
Other adjustments are staggered over the year, however. Our results indicate a regular timing pattern
in wage setting. We then explore the existence of state-dependency. We argue that our long sample
period, characterised by substantial variation in both inﬂation and unemployment, provides an ideal
testing ground for diﬀerent wage setting theories. In short, we ﬁnd very limited evidence of signif-
icant state-dependent factors, only a positive relation between the frequency of wage decreases and
unemployment.
If wage setting varies across sectors and occupations, simple models, where wage contracts are
identical but staggered over time, may miss important dynamics. Moreover, the mean frequency of
change will not be an appropriate summary statistic to describe the aggregate wage ﬂexibility in an
economy. We ﬁnd limited heterogeneity in wage setting among diﬀerent industries and occupations.
There is clear evidence of heterogeneity, however, when ﬁrms are categorised by size; smaller ﬁrms
change wages less frequently than large ﬁrms. When weighted across both industries and occupations,
the monthly frequency of wage change is 10.5%, or almost identical to the overall frequency.
Finally, we estimate a hazard function of wage change. The hazard function is ﬂat during the ﬁrst
year with the hazard of change ranging from 10% to 15%. At 12 months, there is a substantial spike.
We conclude that, in line with previous evidence reported in the paper, wage setting is consistent
with the Taylor (1980) ﬁxed duration contract model, but there exist contracts with both shorter and
longer duration than precisely one year.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the key elements of the
Icelandic labour market. Section 3 sets the stage and brieﬂy reviews the main models of staggered
wage setting. Section 4 describes the dataset used. In Section 5, we present evidence on the frequency
and size of wage changes, the duration of wage spells, the time- and state-dependency in wage setting
and the heterogeneity in wage changes. Section 6 explores the distribution of wage change over time.
In Section 7, we estimate the hazard of wage change. Section 8 concludes.
42 Wage setting in the Icelandic labour market
Iceland has the highest union density among OECD countries, at 86% in 2007 (stats. OECD), and
bargaining coverage is even higher. In the private sector, unions are organised on an occupational
basis and are aﬃliated with ﬁve national federations that are in turn aﬃliated with the Icelandic
Confederation of Labour (ASI). Employers are highly organised as well.
This gives rise to wage setting that is characterised by high centralisation and co-ordinated bar-
gaining, most frequently by the national federations. This leads to more or less nationwide settlements
that provide for the minimum wage increases. In addition, the tailoring of national framework pay
agreements in sectoral and ﬁrm-level negotiations makes it possible to take speciﬁc local conditions
into account. As a rule, the contracts include Government-sponsored tripartite agreements and/or
social pacts.
The duration of contracts has increased over the past two decades. During our sample period
(1998-2010), the duration of contracts has been 3-4 years (see Table 1). As a rule, the contracts
contain some kind of trigger clauses according to which settlements can be revoked if the premises
on which they are based – usually some kind of CPI threshold – fail to hold. If assumptions do not
hold (which has been the case more often than not), the contracting parties can either review the
wage package within the settlement or revoke the settlement en bloc. Reviews generally result in wage
increases that nonetheless are far smaller than those that would have been necessary to maintain the
purchasing power originally intended when the agreements were signed.
Table 1: Wage Index and Union Wage Contracts
Private Sector





Notes: Numbers are average changes per year.
Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.
The structure of the wage bargains is usually the same: wage increases take eﬀect upon signing
and then on 1 January each year. This is clearly manifested in Figure 3. As most contracts expire at
5the end of the last year of the settlement period and it takes some time to work out a new contract,
the initial wage increases included in the new contract (2000, 2004 and 2008) are usually spread out
over a few months (usually Q2), whereas in intervening years we see spikes in January, when between
60% and 80% of the sample experiences a wage increase. During the recession, 2009-2010, there was
no January spike, as the wage increases implied in the contract were postponed during those years.
We also observe two small spikes in June and in November, which coincide with the payment of special
holiday bonus payments.
3 Economic theory of staggered wage setting
In the macroeconomic literature, several paths have been taken in modelling wage setting and nominal
wage rigidity. The general notion is that nominal rigidities lead to long-lasting eﬀects on real activity
because of staggering of contracts; not all wage rates are reset at the same time. Even for the collective
notion of staggering, wage setting has been modelled as to be triggered by several factors, leading to
various time proﬁles of wage adjustment and diﬀerent results for the transmission of monetary shocks.
Before we begin our empirical investigation, we therefore present an overview of wage setting models
and highlight their characteristics, which can be detected in the data.
In our brief overview, we distinguish between two classes of wage and price duration models: time-
dependent and state-dependent duration models.3 In time-dependent duration models, wage changes
are a function of time, either ﬁxed or random, and as time passes, the shorter it becomes until wages
are reset. Conversely, state-dependent duration models describe wage setting as dependent on the
state of the economy.
3.1 Time-dependent duration models
Within the class of time-dependent duration models, it is important to distinguish further among
various models with diﬀerent implications about monetary neutrality. First, consider wage rules,
where nominal wages are predetermined for some number of periods in discrete order. The ﬁrst
introduction of a theoretical model of predetermined wage setting is in Fisher (1977). The model
explicitly assumes that wages are set in order to maintain constant real wages and, equivalently,
3For discussion about diﬀerent price- and wage setting models see e.g. Blanchard and Fisher (1989) and Taylor (1999).
6constancy of employment.4 Based on complete knowledge of history and rational expectations about
the future state of the economy – evolution of the money stock – the wage path is set today for one
or more future periods. In a two-period version of the model, those workers who reset wages now
can choose diﬀerent wages for this period and the next, but the path is predetermined. Staggering in
wage-setting therefore results from diﬀerent time intervals between wage setting for diﬀerent groups.
In the Fisher (1977) model, wages are set in such a manner that markets are expected to clear. This
results from the assumption that, when decisions are made, they are built on rational expectations
about the price level, and deviations from that level cannot aﬀect the wage path.
Taylor (1980) proposes another model, where wage setting is time-dependent. Unlike Fisher (1977),
the Taylor model is a xed-duration model: staggered wage contracts are made at the beginning of a
period and kept ﬁxed for one or more periods before being reset. In a two-period version of the model,
half of the workers set wages today for two periods and the other half reset wages in the next period.5
The wage chosen for the two periods is then the weighted average of the desired wages for each period,
where the desired wage is a function of the price level and aggregate output. As is discussed in both
Taylor (1983) and Cecchetti (1987), the motivation behind such ﬁxed-duration models comes from
institutional arrangements like trade unions.
The Fisher (1977) and Taylor (1980) models both formulate very simple wage-setting functions
in a setting of overlapping time-dependent contracts. Interestingly, however, the eﬀect of changes in
money supply and therefore the role of monetary policy are quite diﬀerent. In the Fisher (1977) model,
although wage adjustment is infrequent, money is neutral. Wage setters choose wages according to
a rational expectation of the price level in each period. Wages of other groups are only taken into
account as they aﬀect the price level, which is expected to persist during the contract. A much-
highlighted corollary is that deviations in employment and aggregate output due to a shock in money
supply do not persist for a longer time than the longest lasting wage contract. In an economy where
wage contracts are characterised by Fisher-like contracts, nominal rigidity will only have a long-lasting
eﬀect on output if contracts have a very long duration. Conversely, Taylor-like wage contracts can
generate output eﬀects that last long beyond the contract length. This results from the assumption
that under ﬁxed wage setting, as in the Taylor (1980) model, wage setters are concerned with relative
4The model builds on observations about the institutional nature of the labour market since, as Fisher (1977) em-
phasises, “wages are usually set in advance of employment”.
5In the original model, each period is assumed to be 6 months, so in a two-period formulation it implies that every 6
months half of the wages in the economy are reset and kept ﬁxed for a year.
7wages. Each group that sets wages is not willing to raise its wage much above the wage of the other
groups’ ﬁxed wage because doing so would make them less competitive. Because of the importance
of relative wages, wage adjustment will be slow and money supply shocks will cause a long-lasting
deviation in output and employment from equilibrium.
A third and widespread model of time-dependent duration is the Calvo (1983) random duration
model.6 In the model, there is a constant probability of wage adjustment at any instant. When large
numbers of wage-setters is assumed, wage setting becomes highly staggered, as only a constant fraction
of wages is adjusted at any point in time. Assuming a continuum of wage-setters, each changing its
wage with the constant probability , the time until the next change follows a Poisson density function.
As time passes, it becomes more likely that the wage has been reset. Even though the Calvo model
does not have a microeconomic foundation, it has been widely used to introduce rigidity in both
nominal prices and wages in New Keynesian models, at least to some extent because of convenience.
3.2 State-dependent duration models
In time-dependent duration models, the probability that wages will be reset increases with time. An-
other obvious trigger for wage-setting is the evolution of the state of the economy. Models where
adjustment of prices is state-dependent include Caplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey, King and Wolman
(1999) and Golosov and Lucas (2007). In those models, price setting is costly because price-setters
are subject to menu costs. We are not aware of state-dependent models of wage setting with micro-
foundations. However, by intuition from the state-dependent pricing models, one can draw inference
about how wage setting under state-dependency will diﬀer from wage setting under time-dependency.
In general, under state-dependent duration of wage spells, wages move towards a trigger point as the
state of the economy evolves. At this trigger point, wages are reset. In an economy where shocks
are relatively infrequent and the state of the economy evolves somewhat smoothly, a state-dependent
duration model would predict wage setting of lower frequency than time-dependent models, but the
average size of change would be large. In contrast, an unstable economy, where relatively frequent
shocks move wages quickly towards a trigger point, would feature more frequent wage setting under
state-dependent contracts than if contracts were renegotiated at certain time intervals.
For research into wage setting in the Icelandic labour market, all the above models seem relevant.
6Interestingly, another model of staggered price setting, Rotemberg (1982), where price-setters face quadratic costs
for adjusting prices, has dynamics similar to those in the Calvo (1983) model. Petursson (1998) estimates the Rotemberg
(1982) model using Icelandic price data.
8A large share of workers are members of labour unions and union wage setting is the microeconomic
foundation built on in Taylor (1980). Triggerclauses in the wage agreements made by Icelandic unions
indicate that wage setting is in part predetermined for several periods, as in Fisher (1977). Fur-
thermore, these clauses allow for a review of the wage package if there is a considerable fall in real
wages, indicating some state-dependent factors. A close look at our comprehensive dataset provides
the opportunity to distinguish between the empirical relevance of various wage setting models.
4 The data
In the paper, we use unpublished conﬁdential micro data from Statistics Iceland. The data are collected
by Statistics Iceland through the Icelandic Survey on Wages, Earnings and Labour costs (ISWEL),
which covers a large share of wages in the private sector and the entire public sector. However, the
inclusion process in the ISWEL survey is not fully completed for the public sector, which is therefore
not included in our dataset. The monthly Wage Index published by Statistics Iceland is based on the
same data. The target population are all Icelandic ﬁrms or activity units with 10 or more employees.
Every month, each ﬁrm in the survey submits electronically standardised and detailed information on
wages, labour costs, working hours, and necessary background factors on both the ﬁrm and workers.
In collaboration with leading Icelandic software ﬁrms, wage software has been modiﬁed to enable
ﬁrms to submit the required detailed information directly from the wage software they are using. This
methodology minimises ﬁrms’ eﬀort and cost related to data collection and aﬀects quality because
direct access minimises the bias caused by recording and reduces individual estimation in managing
the data. A crucial part of the data collection process is the low eﬀort on behalf of the ﬁrm after the
necessary amendments have been made to the wage software when ﬁrms enter the sample. Because
of this, ﬁrms agree to give information on a monthly basis and remain in the sample for long time.7
Our sample period is from January 1998 to September 2010, the longest available period.8 The
dataset includes wage information covering over 80% of the private sector. Wage data are sampled
for all workers aged 16 to 74 in a given ﬁrm, excluding ﬁrm owners and apprentices. For each worker,
we have information about his or her date of birth, gender, residence, nationality, country of birth,
7To maintain high quality of data, Statistics Iceland performs an extensive data quality check when receiving the data
from the ﬁrms. In addition, strong emphasis is placed on giving feedback to both the ﬁrms and the software companies.
Because of constant feedback, data problems are addressed and solved immediately.
8Data for workers in ﬁnancial services are only available from January 2004 to September 2010.
9occupation, and length of work experience, both with the current employer and in the labour market.9
Firms are separated into groups by industry. Wages and working hours are reported at monthly
frequency. Hours are divided into daytime and overtime hours.
We have ﬁve diﬀerent measures of wages, where the wider deﬁnitions include payments such as
overtime pay, overhead compensation, allowances, bonuses, and other forms of compensation. As
a measure of wages – base wages – we use wages for daytime work divided by number of daytime
hours. We do not have information on whether workers are salaried or paid by the hour. However,
for those who are paid by the hour, our measure of the hourly base wage should equal their hourly
wage. For salaried workers, the number of hours in a month is a ﬁxed number. Thus base wages for
salaried workers should not change unless their salary is changed. Wider deﬁnitions of wages, which
are included in our data, are much more volatile, both in size of change and frequency. Measurements
of frequency and size of change in base wages are more relevant for macroeconomic interpretation and
therefore the focus of this study.10
In all, our dataset contains 2.6 million observations over the sample period of 13 years. The
dataset contains 85,534 individual workers with a mean age of 45.11 In our analysis, we look at wages
for workers in continuing jobs and therefore match employers and employees into employer-employee
pairs or relationships. In total, we have 116,709 employer-employee relationships, including 62,918
are for male workers and 53,791 for female workers. Firms are categorised into ﬁve diﬀerent indus-
tries: industrial production, construction industry, trade and repair service, transport, and ﬁnancial
services. Workers are separated into seven diﬀerent occupations: managers; specialists, technicians,
oﬃce personnel, craftsmen and production, blue-collar workers, and service, sales and support. Table
2 illustrates the industrial and occupational composition of the dataset.
The dataset we use has various unique advantages for researching nominal wage rigidity. First,
the data are collected directly from ﬁrms’ wage software but not through interviews with workers or
postal surveys. This should result in minimal measurement errors for both wages and working hours.
Second, the data are of monthly frequency, the same frequency as most wage payments. Except for
L¨ unnemann and Wintr (2009), who use micro data on monthly frequency for Luxembourg to assess
9The variable for residence takes the value 1 for those who live in the capital area and 0 for regional Iceland.
Information on education and years of education are included in the database but is incomplete and cannot be used in
the analysis.
10Evaluation of theories such as the Eﬃciency wage theory might be conducted using data on more wider deﬁnitions
of wages and compensation; however, this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
11To put the size of our sample into context, the Icelandic labour force was 152,100 in 1998 and 181,000 in 2010.
10Table 2: Industry and Occupational Composition of the Dataset and Employment per Subgroup
Industry Total Empl.a Occupation Total Empl.a
Industrial production 35.259 13% Managers 3.699 8%
Construction industry 9.941 7% Specialists 6.021 16%
Trade and repair services 36.082 13% Technicians 8.304 15%
Transport 24.413 7% Oﬃce personnel 13.114 7%
Financial services, 11.566 5% Service, sales and support 37.032 19%
pension funds and insurances Craftsmen and production 6.077 19%
Blue-collar workers 48.580 7%
Notes: The number of employer-employee relationships for the period from January 1998 to September 2010,
except workers and ﬁrms in Financial services, pension funds and insurances where the period is from January
2004 to September 2010.
a Number of employed workers in each subgroup as percentage of the labour force, including the farm industry
and public sector. Numbers are averages for the whole sample period. In total, the sample represents over
80% of the private sector. Source: Statistics Iceland.
nominal wage rigidity, other studies have used data with quarterly frequency, as in Heckel et al. (2008)
or, for four month intervals, as in Barattieri et al. (2010). Third, our dataset covers a long continuous
period of time, 153 months, with great variation in macroeconomic conditions, both in inﬂation and
in unemployment.
We make four amendments to the dataset in order to prevent possible biases or errors in our
estimates. First we round the hourly base wage to the next 10 Icelandic kr´ onur (ISK).12 This prevents
the occurrence of variation at that very low margin as a result of rounding in worked hours or monthly
wages. For some subset of workers, we ﬁnd wage changes that take the form of a V-shape or an inverted
V-shape, i.e. wage increases that are reversed by wage decreases in the subsequent month, or vice
versa. Such variation is likely caused by misreporting, either in hours or in wages. If wage changes
are reversed in the following month, we regard the wage change as non-permanent, based on the
assumption that changes in wages are costly and therefore are not implemented frequently. We use
a simple algorithm that detects such non-permanent changes, and we report them as though there
were no change in wages in that month. With the same argument, wage changes in three consecutive
months are treated in the same way. Last, wage changes of extreme size are omitted in order to limit
the eﬀect of such outliers on the measure of the mean wage adjustment size, as we consider them as
measurement errors. This excludes about 1% of observations from each tail of the distribution.
12ISK 10 equalled EUR 0.06 or USD 0.09 at the time this paper was written.
115 Frequency and size of wage changes
We match employees, i, and their employers, j, in employer-employee relationships. We denote wij;t as
the hourly base wage paid to employee i working for employer j in month t. The employer-employee
relationships are assumed to be created in month t, when wage payments wij;t are ﬁrst observed, and
destroyed in the month t + n when the last wage payment is observed. For each employer-employee
relationship we therefore have an n-long wage trajectory. Each wage trajectory can be divided into
wage spells, where a wage spell is deﬁned as a continuous period without a wage change. Wage
trajectories can therefore be divided into one or more wage spells, depending on the length of the
employer-employee relationships and how often wages are changed. For all relationships, ij, that have
lasted for two consecutive months we create monthly indicators, Iij;t, indicating whether wages have







1 if wij;t > wij;t 1
0 otherwise






1 if wij;t < wij;t 1
0 otherwise






1 if wij;t = wij;t 1
0 otherwise
One of the main measures of the degree of wage rigidity is the frequency of wage change. In our
notation, the monthly frequency of wage change in the labour market, summing over all employer-












i.e. the average frequency of change in a given month, t. Analogously, the mean frequency of wage




















Corresponding to the mean monthly frequency of wage change, we deﬁne the mean duration of
wage spells. If we assume a constant probability  of wage change, as in the Calvo model, the frequency








Another important measure of wage adjustment is the size of wage changes. We use the indicators
























t are, respectively, the average percentage increases and decreases of wages in a given
month, t.
5.1 Wage adjustment and duration of wage spells
Our principal measure of the degree of nominal wage rigidity is the frequency of wage adjustments.
Following Bils and Klenow (2004), the frequency of price change has been the reference point for
the degree of nominal price rigidity. Our measures of wage rigidity are therefore comparable to the
evidence of price rigidity estimated using monthly microdata. The ﬁrst column in Table 3 reports the
mean frequency of wage change, whereas the second and third columns report the frequency of wage
increase and wage decrease, respectively. The mean monthly frequency of change for all workers in
our sample is 10.8%, and the mean frequency of wage increases is 10.3%. We ﬁnd evidence of nominal
wage cuts; the mean frequency of wage decreases is 0.5% per month.
Assuming a constant hazard of change – a standard assumption applied in much of the price and
wage rigidity literature – we can invert our measure of mean frequency of change, giving a measure of
the average duration of wage spells. Corresponding to the mean frequency of wage change, the implied
duration of a wage spell is 8.7 months, or almost three quarters. The frequency of change and the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14models that capture staggering of wage adjustment through a setting such as the Calvo mechanism.
Although wages for male workers are slightly more rigid than those for female workers, with a
10.6% monthly frequency of change for males compared to an 11.1% frequency for females, there does
not seem to be a substantial gender diﬀerence in wage setting. We also estimate the frequency of
wage changes by workers’ residense, and ﬁnd little diﬀerence in the frequency of wage change between
workers living in the capital area and those living in regional Iceland.
We ﬁnd that adjustment of wages is generally infrequent. This is expected because the adjustment
process is costly; both the bargaining process and adjustment of wage payments require time and
resources. However, because wage adjustment is costly, we would not only expect wage adjustment to
be infrequent; we would also expect them to be large when wages are changed, even though adjustment
to shocks is sluggish. Columns four and ﬁve in Table 3 report the mean size of wage increases and
the mean absolute size of wage decreases, both in levels.13 The mean size of increase for all workers
is 6.3%, and the mean absolute size of wage decrease is 4.8%. We also estimate a median increase of
3.9% and a median absolute decrease of 3.1%. In Figure 1 we plot a histogram of all non-zero wage
changes, excluding extreme values. The histogram is constructed using a bar for each percentage point
of size change. This means that the height of a certain bar, e.g. the bar at 1%, shows the fraction of
wage changes of the size from 1% up to 2%. There is a substantial variation in the size of adjustment;
increases range from 1% to 30% and decreases from -1% to -15%. However, as Figure 1 illustrates,
only a small fraction, or 5%, of wage changes are decreases. We also observe a great variation in the
size of increases and decreases over time. On a yearly basis, the mean size of increases ranges from
4.6% to 7.5%, and 3.1% to 6.1% for decreases. In this context we should emphasise the great variation
in inﬂation and unemployment over the sample period, when inﬂation ranged from 0.8% to 18.6% and
monthly unemployment from 0.8% to 9.3%. In Section 5.4, we explore the relationship of inﬂation
and unemployment with the frequency and size of wage adjustment.
In the fourth row of Table 3, we report the frequency and size of wage change, excluding changes
according to union settlements. This is an ad hoc method where we have historically identiﬁed dates
of wage changes related to union settlements and should give a rough estimate of wage adjustments
that are at the discretion of ﬁrms only. After controlling for wage changes due to union settlements,
13We choose to report wage changes as percentage change in levels rather than log diﬀerences since changes in levels
are more intuitive and log diﬀerences may in some cases underestimate wage changes. Another reason to use levels rather
than logs is for comparability between sections where we report sizes and where we plot histograms and distributions of
wage changes.
15Figure 1: Size of Nominal Wage Changes
the frequency of wage changes decreases to 4.7% and the mean size of increases drops to 6.1%.
As is noted in the Introduction, the number of studies that estimate the frequency of wage change
and duration of wage spells is limited, especially those using monthly data. However, most research
on nominal price rigidity uses monthly microdata and reports results on monthly frequency.14 Our
results on wage behaviour are therefore comparable to the literature on price behaviour using monthly
microdata. To compare our results to previous studies of wage rigidity that use lower-frequency data,
we can transform our monthly frequency of change to a mean quarterly frequency of 37% and a
mean yearly frequency of 75%.15 L¨ unnemann and Wintr (2009), the only other paper known to the
authors that reports frequency using monthly micro data, reports monthly frequency of wage change
in Luxembourg between 9% and 14%. Using quarterly data collected from ﬁrms through a postal
survey, Heckel et al. (2008) report a 38% quarterly frequency of wage change. Barattieri et al. (2010)
estimate the frequency of wage change in the US using data from a survey of workers conducted
every four months. They report a 17.8% quarterly frequency of wage change after having adjusted
for possible measurement errors. Druant et al. (2009) report an average duration of wage spells of
15 months, using data collected through a ﬁrm survey among European ﬁrms. In another survey of
European ﬁrms, Fabiani, Kwapil, R˜ o˜ om, Galuscak and Lamo (2010) ﬁnd that around 60% of ﬁrms
14See Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for frequency of price
change in the US. See Gudmundsson et al. (2011) for frequency of price change in Iceland.
15These are approximations made under the assumption of constant monthly frequency of change. A constant monthly
frequency of 10.8% transforms into 37% quarterly frequency (1 (1 0:108)
3 = 0:37) and 75% yearly frequency of wage
change (1   (1   0:108)
12 = 0:75) .
16adjust wages once a year and 12% more frequently.
To summariase, we ﬁnd that wages are adjusted infrequently and by a relatively large amount when
adjusted. Furthermore, our measures are broadly in line with the limited micro evidence available for
European countries, but wages are adjusted more frequently than Barattieri et al. (2010) report for
the US.
5.2 Duration of wage spells
In the previous section, we extrapolated the mean duration of wage spells from our estimates of
the mean frequency of wage change. This inference was made under the assumption of a constant
monthly probability of change. However, direct evidence on the distribution of wage spell durations can
provide important and valuable evidence on how monetary shocks are transmitted to the real economy
and, more precisely, information on the timing of the transmission process. We devote Section 7 to
estimation of the hazard function, i.e. the discrete-time probability of a change in nominal wages
conditional on the wage spell reaching that age, which gives deeper information about the duration
of wage spells and allows us to distinguish between the empirical relevance of diﬀerent wage setting
models.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of wage spell durations. Before plotting the distribution, we have
taken account of several factors. First, we drop all wage trajectories that are only one wage spell, i.e.
employer-employee relationships where wages are never reset during the period observed. Second, we
focus only on completed wage spells and therefore exclude both right-censored spells, where the end
of the spell is not observed, and left-censored spells where the beginning of the spell is not observed.
Figure 2 shows that there is a substantial variation in the duration of spells. Most of the spells last
one year or less. The mean wage spell duration is 8.9 months, similar to the duration implied by the
mean monthly frequency, and the median duration is 7 months. Spells that last precisely one year are
most frequent, or 13.5% of spells.16 However, as is shown on the right portion of the ﬁgure, there is
a signiﬁcant fraction of long-lasting wage spells. About one-ﬁfth of spells last longer than a year, and
some spells last up to three years.
Dixon and Kara (2011) show that in an economy with various lengths of wage contracts, the
existence of only a small proportion of long contracts can signiﬁcantly increase the output persistence
following a monetary shock. They develop a DSGE model where wage setting is modelled as a
16The distribution of spells is similar when we exclude union settlement changes.
17Figure 2: Distribution of Wage Spell Durations
Notes: Durations are in months. All left-censored and right-censored wages spells have
been excluded.
generalisation of the staggered wage contract setting of Taylor (1980), and they allow for wage contracts
of diﬀerent lengths. The reason why even a small number of long contracts can generate an increase
in persistence is that long contracts create a spillover eﬀect. Since longer contracts adjust slowly to
monetary shocks, shorter contracts will also adjust slowly, as the desired wage depends on the price
level, which further depends on the wages of those with longer contracts. The spillover from longer
to shorter contracts is therefore through the slow and more persistent eﬀect of long contracts on the
price level. In light of the results in Dixon and Kara (2011), our ﬁndings of a signiﬁcant number of
long wage spells provide an empirical explanation for output persistence.
5.3 Time dependence: staggering or synchronisation
In Section 3, we reviewed some models in which wages are not directly adjusted following a shock but
adjusted at ﬁxed or random time intervals, i.e. wage setting is time-dependent. If wage adjustment is
dependent on time, the degree of synchronisation (how large a fraction of wages are adjusted at the
same time) and the degree of staggering (how wage adjustment is distributed over time) becomes an
important factor determining how aggregate shocks and monetary policy aﬀect the real economy.
Figure 3 plots the frequency of wage change, separated into increases and decreases, per month over
the sample period. In a typical month, the frequency of change is relatively low and stable. However,
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Figure 3: Frequency of Nominal Wage Changes, January 1998 - September 2010
of this pattern, Figure 4 plots the frequency by months for a typical year. While a substantial share
of wage adjustments are distributed over the course of the year, a clear pattern is revealed; 48% of
wages change in January and, additionally, we see two small peaks in June and November. Those
three peaks correspond in general to implementation of wage increases negotiated by unions. The
timing of wage changes is therefore characterised by a combination of synchronisation of changes in
January but also a substantial staggering over other months, with positive frequency in every month.
Similar clustering of wage changes in January has been identiﬁed in other European countries (see e.g
L¨ unnemann and Wintr, 2009 and Druant et al., 2009). However, Barattieri et al. (2010) do not ﬁnd
evidence of seasonality in wage changes in the US labour market.
Evidence of time-dependent wage setting is mirrored in evidence of ﬁrms’ price setting strategies.
In a recent study of price setting, Olafsson, Vignisdottir and Petursdottir (2011) ﬁnd that Icelandic
ﬁrms’ price review strategies depend on the nature of their cost structure. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that
the share of ﬁrms that use a pure time-dependent price review strategy increases as the share of labour
cost of the total production cost increases, reﬂecting time-dependency in labour costs.
The fact that wage changes are not uniform has important implications for transmission of mon-
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Figure 4: Frequency of Wage Changes by Month
monetary policy can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the real economy at diﬀerent points in time. More
precisely, monetary policy makers are able to create larger responses in economic activity for a given
interest rate change if interest rates are changed when wages are more rigid. The results of Olivei
and Tenreyro (2007) and our ﬁndings concerning synchronisation of changes in January imply that
monetary shocks taking place in the months after a large share of wages has been reset will generate
more output eﬀect than monetary shocks taking place when wages are relatively more ﬂexible.
5.4 State-dependence and cyclicality
Over the period from January 1998 to September 2010, economic conditions in the Icelandic econ-
omy varied greatly. The inﬂation rate was both high and volatile, ranging from 0.8% to 18.6% per
annum. Rapid increases in the price level have generally followed depreciation of the local currency.
Furthermore, our sample includes periods of wide ﬂuctuations in the labour market: sudden shifts
from excess demand to excess supply of labour. After the ﬁnancial collapse in the autumn of 2008, reg-
istered unemployment rose from 1.3% in September 2008 to 9% in April 2009. Our dataset provides
a rare opportunity to evaluate state-dependency in wage setting – a comparison to the analysis of
time-dependency – and therefore the potential to distinguish among diﬀerent strands of wage setting
models. In this Section, we explore how wage setting correlates with the business cycle.
20In Table 3, we report the frequency of change for three periods with diﬀerent labour market con-
ditions: ﬁrst, a period of low unemployment (2005-2007) when registered unemployment averaged
1.5%; second, a period of intermediate level of unemployment (2001-2003) when unemployment aver-
aged 2.4%; and last, a period of exceptionally high unemployment (2009-2010) when unemployment
averaged 8.1%. The frequency of wage change, especially increases, does not show a strong relation
with unemployment. Even though increases are most frequent when unemployment is low, wages are
not found to be very upwardly rigid in times of severe labour market conditions. The frequency of
wage decreases is somewhat more frequent when unemployment is high (0.6% per month), however,
than when unemployment is low (0.4% per month). As regards magnitude, mean increases are greater
when unemployment is low.
Table 4: Correlation with Macroeconomic Variables
Correlation
Unemployment Inﬂation
Frequency of increase -0.13 -0.24
Frequency of decrease 0:40 -0.07
Size of increase -0.17 0.16
Size of decrease 0:37 0.07
Note:
 denotes statistical signiﬁcance of correlation at 5%.
Exploring further the extent of cyclical variation in wage setting, we estimate the correlation
between the frequency and size of wage adjustment with unemployment and inﬂation. We generate
quarterly series of the frequency and size of wage changes, both increases and decreases, by taking
quarterly averages of our monthly series. The quarterly series are then seasonally adjusted using the
X-12 ARIMA procedure provided by the US Census Bureau. We then extract the cyclical component
from the seasonally adjusted series using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter
of 1600. A quarterly series for unemployment is generated by taking quarterly averages of monthly
unemployment as it is registered at the Directorate of Labour.17 In the same way, we generate
quarterly averages of monthly observed headline CPI. Inﬂation is then calculated as the percentage
change in the quarterly series for the CPI. We seasonally adjust both unemployment and inﬂation
17We choose to use averages of the monthly registered unemployment from the Directorate of Labour rather than the
quarterly unemployment rate based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) because the LFS survey was conducted only on
a semi-annual basis before 2003.
21using the X-12 ARIMA procedure and detrend using the HP ﬁlter. Table 4 reports the correlation
between the two macroeconomic series and the four nominal wage series, lagged one period. We do
not ﬁnd much evidence of state-dependency in wage setting. Frequency and size of wage increases
are weakly correlated with unemployment, but frequency of wage decreases and size of decreases have
positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation with unemployment of 0.40 and 0.37 respectively.
None of the wage series has a strong correlation with inﬂation. The weak correlation between
nominal wage changes and inﬂation can be traced, at least to some extent, to the factors driving the
variation in the inﬂation rate and nominal wage increases. As upswings often turn into overheating
with a tight labour market, nominal wage increases drive real wage growth, whereas during downswings
the depreciation of the Icelandic kr´ ona drives inﬂation.
The fact that neither frequency nor size of wage changes reﬂects a high degree of state dependency
and the strong evidence of time dependent wage contracts we have found lead us to conclude that
models with time-dependent wage setting have more empirical relevance, at least in the Icelandic
labour market, than models with wage setting dependent on variation in the state of the economy.
However, it should be emphasised in this context that wages, nominal and real, do not provide the
only adjustment channel for the labour market. If wages are frictionless, all shocks aﬀecting the
labour market are absorbed through changes in the wage level but not through variation in hours and
employment. Sigurdsson (2011) ﬁnds signiﬁcant cyclical variation in total hours and that Icelandic
ﬁrms adjust labour input almost equally along the intensive and extensive margin. In a recession, ﬁrms
both reduce hours worked per worker and lay workers oﬀ, increasing the ﬂow into unemployment, which
drives up the unemployment rate.
5.5 Heterogeneity across rms and workers
Generally, nominal wage rigidity is modelled assuming a homogeneous group of agents that have
identical wage contracts, but the wage setting is staggered through time. If individual industries
or occupations display a substantial degree of heterogeneity in wage setting, e.g. diﬀer in the sense
that some have time-dependent wage contracts while other contracts are state-dependent, such simple
models might omit out important dynamics. In this Section we therefore explore heterogeneity both
across workers and ﬁrms.
Table 5 reports the monthly frequency and size of wage change, where ﬁrms have been divided

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24ﬁnancial services to 12.0% in the transport industry. Both increases and decreases are most frequent
in transport, where the probability of a wage decrease in a given month is 0.7%, compared to 0.3%
in ﬁnancial services.18 Furthermore, we ﬁnd more seasonality in wage changes in the transportation
industry, partially explaining the higher frequency of change than is found in other sectors. We
calculate the weighted average frequency of change using the weights used by Statistics Iceland to
compute the Wage Index, ﬁnding a mean weighted frequency of 10.5%. As regards the mean size of
change, the size of increase in ﬁnancial services stands out in magnitude. The recession that began
in 2008 hit the ﬁnancial and construction sectors especially hard. In our data, we ﬁnd evidence of
substantial nominal wage decreases in both construction and ﬁnancial services in late 2008 and early
2009.
In Table 6, we report the frequency and size of wage change for workers in seven diﬀerent occupa-
tional subgroups. We ﬁnd relatively limited heterogeneity across occupations. We would expect that
salaried workers have more rigid wages than those paid by the hour and that the change is larger when
their wages are adjusted. This inference is supported by evidence from our data. The most frequent
wage changes are for workers in services with monthly frequency of change of 11.9%, but the most
rigid wages are among managers, for whom the probability of wage change in a given month is 9.3%.
Wages for workers in service, sales and support are also relatively more ﬂexible downwards, with the
monthly frequency of decrease at 0.7%. Specialists are similar to managers in that they are likely to
be salaried, have also relatively rigid wages, with a probability of change in a given month of 9.6%.
When weighted across occupations, the monthly frequency of change for the sample is 10.5%.
5.6 Wage adjustment by rm size
Is the ﬂexibility in wages variable between ﬁrms of diﬀerent size? Larger ﬁrms may have greater ability
to apply ﬁrm-level wage contracts rather than contracts such as those negotiated by unions. This may
result in a higher degree of wage ﬂexibility in large ﬁrms, as they can apply more discretionary wage
determination processes. Furthermore, the wage structure is often more complicated in larger ﬁrms,
characterised by various compensation payments and bonuses. Such a wage structure may have a
general ﬁrm-level eﬀect on base wages where overall wage payments may follow a similar path within
the ﬁrm. The cost of changing wages may also be relatively higher in small ﬁrms than in large ﬁrms,
18It should be noted that the sample period for ﬁnancial services is January 2004 throughout September 2010, as
opposed to January 1998 throughout September 2010 for other industry groups.
25as the action of changing wages may involve some ﬁxed cost. As a result, wages will adjust more
frequently in large ﬁrms than small ﬁrms.
Table 7: Frequency and Size of Wage Change by Firm Size
Mean Frequency Mean Size Wage Spell
Number of Change Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Implied Duration
employeesa (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (months)
10-19 9.0 8.5 0.5 5.9 4.2 10.6
20-49 9.9 9.3 0.6 5.8 4.9 9.5
50-149 10.2 9.6 0.6 6.4 5.4 9.3
 150 10.8 10.3 0.5 6.3 4.7 8.7
Notes: All frequencies reported are in percentage per month. The mean size is the mean percentage
change per month. The size of decrease is reported in absolute terms. Implied duration is calculated
under the assumption that the hazard rate of wage change is the constant  and the probability of
a wage change is f = 1   e
 . The mean implied duration is therefore d =  1=ln(1   f), where f
is the mean frequency of wage change.
a As Statistics Iceland does not include ﬁrms in their sample that have less than 10 workers the
smallest subgroup strictly includes ﬁrms with 10-19 employees.
In an inﬂuential study, Bewley (1999) ﬁnds that ﬁrms are reluctant to cut nominal wages since this
is thought to damage workers’ morale. He argues as well that productivity hinges on workers’ morale.
The eﬀect of nominal wage cuts on morale may be thought more important in smaller ﬁrms, where
the relation between employees and their employers is stronger. This reluctance to cut nominal wages
may result in nominal wages being more downwardly rigid, and even more so in smaller ﬁrms. This
can also lead to wage increases being more compressed, as is emphasised by Elsby (2009), because
ﬁrms fear costly wage cuts in the future. The argument made in Elsby (2009), together with the fact
that workers are more strongly connected to their employers in smaller ﬁrms, leads us to expect less
frequent wage changes, both increases and decreases, the smaller the ﬁrm.
Table 7 reports the frequency of wage change, the size of change, and the implied duration of wage
spells for four diﬀerent size categories. We ﬁnd strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that wages
are more rigid in small ﬁrms than large ﬁrms.19 The frequency of change in ﬁrms with fewer than
20 employees is 9.0%, compared to 10.8% monthly frequency in ﬁrms with 150 employees or more.
This evidence is in line with previous research. Both Heckel et al. (2008) and L¨ unnemann and Wintr
19Firm size also seems to matter for the frequency of price setting; large ﬁrms set prices more often than smaller ﬁrms,
see L¨ unnemann and Math¨ a (2007). Olafsson et al. (2011) ﬁnd that, in Iceland, price reviews are more frequent among
larger ﬁrms.
26(2009) ﬁnd a substantial diﬀerence in the frequency of change between ﬁrms of diﬀerent size, large
ﬁrms changing wages more frequently. Druant et al. (2009) present similar evidence using survey
data.
6 Distribution of wage changes
The notion in economics that prices and wages are sticky dates at least back to Keynes (1936). A
further notion about this inertia is that nominal wage rigidity is asymmetric; wages are more rigid
downwards than upwards. If this is the case, it has important macroeconomic implications, especially
for inﬂation targeting monetary policy, but also for membership in monetary unions. As is argued by
Tobin (1972), downward nominal wage rigidity causes unemployment because shocks that lead to a
decrease in demand or increased supply raise real wages above marginal product. Tobin (1972) further
argued that, because of this property monetary policy makers can “grease the wheels” of the labour
market by targeting inﬂation above zero.
Until recently most of the literature on wage rigidity focused on downward wage rigidity rather than
generally on how frequently wages are adjusted.20 There is however limited agreement in the literature
on if and how extensively nominal wages are downwardly rigid. Recently, researchers have used micro
data to study distributions of wage changes to provide an empirical answer to these questions (see,
for example, Dickens et al., 2007; Holden and Wulfsberg, 2007). Even though the current paper does
not intend to answer this question per se, we direct our focus at the properties of the distribution of
changes in our data. Presumably, nominal wage cuts should be less likely when inﬂation is high and
unemployment low than in periods with low inﬂation or adverse labour market conditions. Our dataset
enables us both to shed light on the asymmetry in the distribution of changes and to make a more
general inference about downward nominal wage rigidity at times of diﬀerent economic conditions.
Figure 5 plots the yearly distribution of the size of wage changes for nine years. Each histogram
is constructed using a bin for each percentage point of size change, meaning that the height of each
bin shows the fraction of workers with wage changes in that range. We omit both extreme values at
either end of the distribution and all zero changes so as to enable a clearer view of the centre of the
distribution, but we include a zero spike to give a reference point. In Figure 5, we have also included
a ﬁtted normal distribution for the size of wage changes (solid line) and an estimated Kernel density
20See, for example, McLaughlin (1994), Card and Hyslop (1996), Kahn (1997), Smith (2000), and Nickell and Quintini
(2003). See Gottschalk (2005) for a review of the literature.
27(a) 2005, mean 6.4%, meadian 3.4% (b) 2006, mean 6.2%, meadian 4.0% (c) 2007, mean 6.2%, meadian 3.5%
Low Unemployment
(d) 2001, mean 5.9%, meadian 4.0% (e) 2002, mean 4.7%, meadian 3.3% (f) 2003, mean 5.1%, meadian 3.6%
Intermediate Unemployment
(g) 2008, mean 6.4%, meadian 5.2% (h) 2009, mean 4.7%, meadian 3.7% (i) 2010, mean 4.2%, meadian 2.9%
High Unemployment
Figure 5: Distributions of Non-Zero Wage Changes
Notes: Histograms of non-zero nominal wage changes, a ﬁtted normal distribution (solid line) and estimated
Kernel density (dotted line).
28(dotted line). Each row in Figure 5 represents a period of diﬀerent labour market conditions: low,
intermediate and high unemployment.
If downward nominal wage rigidity is present, what properties would characterise the distribution
of wage changes? The distribution would be non-normal and highly asymmetric, with only very low
or even no density below zero and a large zero-spike. We look for these features in the distributions we
plot. What we see ﬁrst is that there is great variation in the size of changes, even in years with adverse
labour market conditions. Secondly, wage changes are not normally distributed and have much more
clustering around the median compared to the normal distribution. Third, a considerable share of
wages is unchanged over a whole year (a zero spike). And ﬁnally, even though wage increases are much
more frequent than decreases, there is a positive density below zero in all years plotted. Speciﬁcally,
wage cuts appear to have been one channel of adjustment in the recession starting in 2008. Illustrated
in the histogram for 2008 there is a clear distinct spike at -10% and relatively high density below zero.
To summarise, we ﬁnd that the distributions display some of the features we expect to ﬁnd under
downward nominal rigidity but do not seem to be strictly binding.
7 The hazard of wage change
The economic theory on staggered wage setting implies various diﬀerent duration proﬁles of wage
spells that depend on whether wage setting is contingent on time, either ﬁxed or random, or the state
of the economy. By estimating the conditional probability of wage change – the hazard rate – we are
able to test the empirical relevance of diﬀerent theoretical wage setting models, such as those proposed
by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Furthermore, by estimating the hazard function we can evaluate
how well diﬀerent theoretical wage setting models can simulate wage setting in the Icelandic labour
market.
In previous sections, we have explicitly assumed a constant hazard of wage change, , which is
true for the Calvo model. Under this assumption, we were able to report the average duration of wage
spells implied by the mean frequency of wage change. We have also reported the distribution of wage
spells, ﬁnding both that a large share of spells have a lifetime under a year and that a substantial
fraction last longer than a year.
A general way of describing wage spells is to express the hazard rate as a function of time, (t). In
discrete time where T is a random variable denoting the duration of a generic wage spell, the hazard
29function is explicitly deﬁned as:




where f(:) is the probability density function and S(:) is the survival function, describing the lifetime
of wage spells. The hazard function therefore describes the probability of a wage change in period t,
conditional on survival of a wage spell until the start of period t.
What do wage setting models imply about the shape of the hazard function? If the probability of a
wage change increases directly with the duration of a wage spell, the hazard function takes an upward
sloping shape. This would indicate that a state-dependent duration model, where the hazard of change
increases as wages move farther from a desired level, is an appropriate theoretical description. On the
other hand, the Taylor (1980) model gives rise to a hazard function with spikes at the duration of
contracts. Speciﬁcally, if the labour market is characterised by one-year wage contracts, the hazard
function would display a large spike at 12 months. If the timing between wage adjustments is random,
as is assumed in the Calvo (1983) model, the hazard of change will not vary and the hazard function
is ﬂat. By estimating the hazard function, we can distinguish empirically between these models and
the nature of wage setting.
New wage spells begin either at the start of a new employer-employee relationship or directly after
a wage change. A common problem in survival analysis is censoring, i.e. the length of spells is not
known exactly. This can take the form of either right- or left-censoring. In the case of right-censoring,
the end of a wage spell has not yet occurred at the end date, while for left-censored spells the start
date of spell is not observed. We choose to drop all left- and right-censored spells and estimate the
hazard function only for the subset of completed wage spells.
Figure 6 plots the estimated hazard function, described by equation (5), for changes in nominal
wages. The hazard function is mostly ﬂat during the ﬁrst year, with the monthly hazard of change
ranging from 10% to 15%. At 12 months, however, a large spike is observed. After the ﬁrst year the
hazard function has smaller spikes at 16, 20, and 24 months. However, after 12 months, the survival
probability of a generic wage spell has dropped down to 15%. In light of economic theory, the shape of
the estimated hazard function is highly intuitive; the hazard function represents a pattern consistent
with ﬁxed-time wage contracts as predicted by the Taylor model. Along with Figure 4, our results















Figure 6: Hazard Function for Wages
and are reset in January. Shorter and longer spells are staggered over the course of the year.
The literature estimating nominal price rigidity, e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), has empha-
sised that heterogeneity across products must be accounted for. In section 5.5, we found that there
is limited heterogeneity in the labour market, across both ﬁrms and workers. We estimate separate
hazard functions for all industries and occupational subgroups. We ﬁnd great homogeneity in the
shape of all hazard functions estimated, all ﬂat over the ﬁrst year and displaying a signiﬁcant twelve-
month spike. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence of upward-sloping hazard functions. One plausible
explanation for this homogeneity is the centralisation in wage setting that characterises the Icelandic
labour market.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a number of facts about wages and wage adjustment at the microeconomic
level. We use a unique dataset at monthly frequency covering wages in the Icelandic labour market
over the period from 1998 through 2010. This dataset provides valuable evidence on wage rigidity
because of both the quality of the data and the period covered.
The facts we establish are consistent with a model of time-dependent wage contracts of ﬁxed
31duration. Wage adjustments are infrequent, and most of them are increases. Wage setting is partially
synchronised at the beginning of the year but is also staggered over the course of the year. Inﬂation
does not aﬀect wage adjustment, but adverse labour conditions seem to trigger wage decreases. The
hazard of wage change illustrates a high concentration of ﬁxed-period wage contracts with yearly wage
changes.
Our results may prove helpful both for monetary policy and macroeconomic modelling. New Key-
nesian models that incorporate both imperfect competition and nominal rigidities in wages and prices
must rely on empirical evidence about wages and wage setting. Until recently, information on how
frequently wages are adjusted and what factors are important when modelling wage setting has been
scarce. The evidence presented here will therefore provide necessary information for distinguishing
between alternative wage setting mechanisms for macroeconomic models.
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